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 Abstract 
This chapter uncovers the complex negotiations for authority in various 
representations about futures of life which have been advanced by different 
branches of the sciences, and have culminated in the emerging concept of life as 
algorithm. It charts the historical shifts in expertise and representations of life, 
from naturalists, to mathematical modellers, and specialists in computation, and 
argues that physicists, game theorists, and economists now take a leading role 
in explaining and projecting futures of life. The chapter identifies Richard 
Dawkins and Max Tegmark at the forefront of the concept of life as algorithm: 
the first inspired by game theory as a means to study evolution; the second 
proposing that a materialist basis of life could place humans and artificial 
intelligence on an equal footing. Through close reading of their respective texts, 
the chapter demonstrates that both thinkers consider life as an algorithm 
programmed to achieve success in survival and reproduction. 
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27 
Life as Algorithm 
S. M. Amadae 
Brains may be regarded as analogous in function to computers … 
Every decision that a survival machine takes is a gamble, and it is the 
business of genes to program brains in advance so that on average they 
take decisions that pay off. The currency used in the casino of 
evolution is survival, strictly gene survival, but for many purposes 
individual survival is a reasonable approximation.1  
First we humans discovered how to replicate some natural processes 
with machines, making our own wind and lightning, and our own 
mechanical horsepower. Gradually, we started realizing that our bodies 
were also machines. Then the discovery of nerve cells started blurring 
the borderline between body and mind. Then we started building 
machines that could outperform not only our muscles, but our minds as 
                                               
1 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford University Press, 1976), 49, 55. 
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well. So in parallel with discovering what we are, are we inevitably 
making ourselves obsolete?2  
[W]e make decisions all the time, and … every decision we make 
reveals something about our goals [aka preferences] … The hope is 
therefore that by observing lots of people in lots of situations (either 
for real or in movies and books), the AI can eventually build an 
accurate model of all our preferences [and construct our environments 
accordingly].3 
The emerging and even triumphant view of life as an algorithm stands in relief 
against a modern background in which life, celebrated as manifesting animism, 
was contrasted to mechanism. Even René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, who 
celebrated the key roles of matter and mechanism in existence, recognized an 
important role for mind in writing the narrative of events conducted by humans 
as agents. Sentient awareness can be a prime mover of the will and, according 
                                               
2 Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (London: 
Penguin, 2017), 319–20. 
3 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 262. 
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to Immanuel Kant, can initiate a causal chain of events.4 Since the late 1960s 
there has been a shift in academic expertise on the nature of life and intelligence 
from naturalists such as Charles Darwin and William James, and biologists 
including James D. Watson and Francis Crick, to mathematical modellers and 
specialists in computation. Thus physicists, game theorists, and economists now 
take a leading role in explaining what life is and in offering visions—some 
aspirational—of human life’s potential futures.5 Although life remains a 
mystery, in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century we can 
identify a new and prevalent strand of thought engaging the nature and purpose 
of biological existence. Theorists in this new tradition recognize that digital and 
information technologies represent a fourth revolution of human understanding 
which further displaces human beings from the centre of God’s cosmos, the 
apex of creation, and the singularity of rational unified agency.6 This essay 
                                               
4 Immanuel Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlichen Preußischen (later 
Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer (later Walter De 
Gruyter), 1913), vol. 5, 96–8. 
5 Along these lines, consider the work of Herbert Gintis, Bounds of Reason (Princeton 
University Press 2009); and Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
6 See, e.g., Luciano Floridi, Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping 
Human Reality (Oxford University Press, 2014), 87–100. 
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considers the writings of Richard Dawkins and Max Tegmark. The first was 
inspired by game theory as the means to study evolution, and the second 
assesses how the materialist basis of life could place humans and artificial 
intelligence on the same footing. Both thinkers consider life as an algorithm 
programmed to achieve success in survival and reproduction. Algorithms are 
material processes with the property that their structure dictates their outcomes. 
Once programmed into a physical substrate they execute the same procedure 
every time they are executed. Algorithms leave no role for a form of agency 
that initiates its own causal chain as a function of, for example, sentient 
awareness and self-direction.7 
This account of life as algorithm, or causal process not materially 
transformed by the contents of consciousness, has determinist implications and 
is currently mainstream. In this view mind, feeling, and meaning are derivative 
of the causal processes from which they arise. The physical processes giving 
rise to life, and phenomenal experience, are deterministic and stochastic, in 
keeping with the physics-based sciences of Newtonian physics and quantum 
theory. One way to understand this position is to think of experiences and 
mental projections as shadows caused by material processes. However, for the 
                                               
7 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, ed. and trans. H. 
J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 
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time being this view is based on metaphysical argumentation.8 Considered in 
accordance with the charity principle, this view of both life and intelligence as 
algorithmic process appears to be fully consistent with the principles of natural 
science and the laws of physics. And yet, not only are there grounds for debate, 
but there are implications for how we imagine and thus potentially realize 
shared futures. The view of existence that is displaced by the materialist view 
provides a role for meaning, reflexive self-awareness, and intelligibility in 
human action and its capacity to realize ends.9 According to the materialist 
conception all possible futures simply reflect an arrangement of the physical 
building blocks of the universe. Opportunities are possible outcomes realizable 
given the current configuration of all physical entities. This approach replaces a 
view of aspirational and shared intention with a view of collective life as 
decomposable into individual-, or even genetic-, level competition. Actors 
satisfy preferences programmed into their physical structures to guide 
                                               
8 For an attempt to ground this debate in natural scientific argumentation see Scott 
Aaronson, ‘The Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine’, in S. Barry Cooper and 
Andrew Hodge (eds.), The Once and Future Turing: Computing the World 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 193–296, available at 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.0159.pdf, accessed 18 November 2018. 
9 John Searle, for example, who also works within naturalistic, evidence-based 
argumentation, Rationality in Action (Bradford Book, 2003). 
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behaviour consistent with evolutionary goals. Neither individual consciousness, 
which may have holistic comprehension of situations, nor shared collective 
awareness, instantiates agency. All action is solely the product of physical 
processes, and reflexive awareness does not add a new dimension of 
intelligence or self-guidance, either individually or collectively. 
Dawkins and Tegmark reflect two related perspectives on life which 
explain its nature and take positions on its significance and meaning. It is 
striking that these theorists are positioned as progressives in politics, and each 
of them, while advocating inclusive economic policies and an egalitarian 
respect for personhood and individualism, also proposes perspectives that 
potentially alienate religious conservatives and establishment traditionalists 
throughout the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic West and Middle East.10 Evolutionary 
game theory, used by Dawkins, offers the view that life must solve objective 
optimization problems. For Dawkins, life is circumscribed by the imperative to 
survive and propagate, which is algorithmically programmed. Tegmark 
concedes that intelligence is optimization and that life solves optimization 
problems. Yet he puts forward the view that if humans can employ artificial 
                                               
10 See the Wikipedia article on Richard Dawkins’s political views to get an overview of 
how this vision of life reduced to the laws of physics has generated controversy, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_views_of_Richard_Dawkins. 
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intelligence in a constructive manner then, rather than decay in world of gross 
inequity, nuclear war, and technological destruction, life can master the control 
of universally available sources of energy and achieve goals without limit.11 In 
the lexicon offered by Tegmark, Dawkins’s analysis remains confined to Life 
2.0, while his own analysis explores how we may view artificial intelligence 
(AI) as coextensive with life extended as it were to a higher level of capability 
for optimization and problem-solving. Tegmark’s novel insight is to offer that 
intelligence is computation: the execution of an algorithm which is embedded 
in deterministic cause–effect processes. Tegmark grounds phenomenal 
consciousness in computation which, by definition, lacks intelligible 
understanding of the significance of action. Meaning is ascribed after the fact of 
action and is not generative of agency. Tegmark looks to a bright possible 
future wherein AI assists humans in satisfying their preferences, and anticipates 
a hybrid world of human and artificial agents, with their boundaries blurred, as 
reflected in this image used on the Future of Life’s website. 
<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 27.1 NEAR HERE> 
Hardwired Selfishness 
                                               
11 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 260–1. 
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In addressing the topic of treating life as an algorithm, focusing on Richard 
Dawkins’s work is useful because he wrote at the forefront of the movement 
treating life and intelligence as programmed. He distilled the significance of the 
research of evolutionary game theorists, and made his theories accessible to a 
large readership by popularizing his ideas.12 In articulating the implications of 
this approach to understanding life, Dawkins argues that organisms’ behaviour 
is programmed by their genetic codes which are selected for promoting the 
survival of individual members of species.13 Dawkins has been so successful in 
proclaiming his views that his book The Selfish Gene (1976) is Oxford 
University Press’s best-selling book of all time. He has also managed to invert 
our understanding of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory as natural selection 
via a process of descent with modification to a view in which genes replicate 
over generations without modification and endlessly compete for survival in 
repeating games. According to Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), life 
                                               
12 Dawkins drew on the cutting edge of evolutionary game theory developed by John 
Maynard Smith, ‘The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflict’, 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 47, no. 209 (1974), 209–21, and R. L. Trivers, ‘The 
Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism’, Quarterly Review of Biology 46, no. 1 (1971), 
35–57. 
13 This is a one-sentence synopsis of Dawkins’s argument running throughout The 
Selfish Gene; see, e.g., the preface to the first edition. 
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forms organized into species developed over prolonged periods of time during 
which their physical traits transformed because those favourable for survival as 
a response to environmental constraints were selected for and therefore were 
expressed in the next generation. Just as animal breeders could develop lineages 
and establish pedigrees to accentuate specific features as criteria for breeding, 
so natural selection could have the same effect, although without intentional 
design. For Darwin, life forms exist as interdependent species incessantly 
adapting to their environments. According to Dawkins, the key unit of 
biological organization is the gene, which he describes as fixed and never 
changing. This immutable gene is either perpetuated into the next generation or 
not, as a function of its ability to program action associated with survival. 
Like Sigmund Freud, who suggested that much of human action is the 
product of subconscious drives and impulses outside of individuals’ awareness 
and conscious control, Dawkins argues that the human intellect and sense of 
self-given purpose are superficial.14 Ideation and meaning are a by-product of 
physical processes that must occur in order to sustain the existence of life’s 
material basis; sentient awareness is not directly relevant to survival and 
reproduction. In the account he puts forward, genetic code in the form of 
                                               
14 See, e.g., Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: Norton, 
1962). 
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segments of DNA must program behaviour that assists the macro-organism 
containing it to be biologically viable. Genes that prevail over competitors are 
represented in ensuing generations of organisms. Dawkins views genes as 
selfish because, according to his analysis, their survival depends on 
programming behaviour that is dedicated to their host’s survival and 
reproduction on an individual, and not a group, basis.15 
Dawkins’s argument proceeds by analytic derivation, and not empirical 
study, and defers to ad hoc discussion of cases which seem to corroborate his 
formal model. His theory is entirely deduced using game theory, which 
provides a mathematical framework for modelling strategic competition. 
Another way to consider game theory is that it provides a method to solve 
multiple constraint problems in which every actor attempts to maximize an 
environmentally limited source of value in competition with like actors. 
Although originally designed to provide strategic solutions to parlour games 
with fixed rules linking actions to rewards, after its inventors John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s 1944 publication of Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior, successive generations of theorists put it to alternative 
                                               
15 An alternative view that selection can also occur at the level of groups has more recently 
become accepted, see, e.g., David Sloan Wilson and Lee A. Dugatkin, ‘Group Selection and 
Assortative Interactions’, The American Naturalist 149, no. 2 (1997), 336–51. 
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uses, initially applying it to warfare.16 It was first applied to model organisms 
confronting natural selection in evolution in the 1960s.17 Dawkins relied on this 
novel research literature to construct his selfish gene argument. 
Understanding Dawkins’s position that ‘genes are master programmers, 
and they are programming for their lives’, and that the environmental pressures 
of natural selection require them to program selfish behaviour is inseparable 
from learning the rudiments of game theory.18 He introduces readers to games, 
or strategic interactions, which like parlour games have rules associating 
particular actions with given outcomes—pay-offs—depending on the actions 
every competitor takes. He leads readers to consider how we would proceed 
‘[i]f we were to program a computer to simulate a model survival machine 
making decisions about whether to behave altruistically’.19 Values need to be 
associated with behavioural choices. Dawkins promises ‘a very over-simplified 
example’, which relies on the concept of expected utility from game theory: ‘I 
                                               
16 Robert Leonard, Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: 
From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
266–343. 
17 Trivers, ‘The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism’, 35–57. 
18 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 62. 
19 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 96. 
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am an animal who has found a clump of eight mushrooms. After taking account 
of their nutritional value, and subtracting something for the slight risk that they 
might be poisonous, I estimate they are worth +6 units each.’20 I need to decide 
whether to share the remaining mushrooms after I am satiated with next of kin 
or not. Before considering strategic calculations, I can perform a parametric 
calculation just considering outcomes without competitors. Next, strategic 
considerations enter into the calculation to determine whether to share. 
Throughout the game theoretic account of strategic action, agents act as if they 
make conscious decisions. Dawkins clearly makes this point, observing, 
‘Animals have to be given by their genes a simple rule for action, a rule that 
does not involve all-wise cognition of the ultimate purpose of the action, but a 
rule that works nevertheless, at least in average conditions.’21 Here Dawkins 
conveys the crucial point about computable algorithms that encompass strategic 
rationality. Those actors animated by algorithmic decision rules do not grasp 
the context or purpose of their action. Hence, they lack intelligible grasp of the 
meaning and implications of their conduct. 
In order to definitively conclude that biological actors cannot be altruistic 
and survive the rigours of natural selection, Dawkins relies on a formal concept 
                                               
20 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 97. 
21 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 99. 
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developed in game theory: the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). This 
concept builds on the original mathematical game theory of the 1950s, 
specifically John F. Nash Jr’s mutual-best-reply equilibrium. According to 
Nash’s solution concept, an equilibrium of individuals’ action choices signifies 
that from that outcome no single individual would choose an alternative action 
to achieve a preferred outcome, because no better choice exists.22 The ESS is 
useful in evolutionary contexts that theorists imagine to be essentially identical, 
given the assumption that thousands of successive generations of actors play the 
same strategic game. Evolutionary game theorists accept the idea that genes 
program behaviour. This behaviour is then selected for or against as a function 
of which types of individuals gain competitive advantage in surviving. The ESS 
represents a population of individuals demonstrating an encompassing 
behavioural pattern such that this pattern will not be modified by small numbers 
of mutant actors exhibiting alternative behaviours. Nash’s original solution 
concept of mutual-best-reply is limited to static contexts, and does not permit 
temporal development. This excludes considering that the types of actors within 
the population can change, for example by becoming either more or less selfish. 
By contrast, the equilibrium solution concept used in evolutionary game theory 
                                               
22 John F. Nash, ‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 36, no. 1 (1950), 48–9. 
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analyses a population with types of actors whose proportions shift as a function 
of which type is more successful in competition against others. This 
equilibrium is more robust than Nash’s mutual-best-reply equilibrium because, 
in studying the development of populations through time, it rules out that any 
small number of rogue actors could perturb the existing status quo pattern of 
actions. 
With the mathematical machinery of the ESS, Dawkins can analytically 
demonstrate selfish gene theory: each organism must act to maximize its own 
survival chances in defiance of either cooperative or altruistic self-abnegation. 
He reinforces this conclusion by modelling actors playing repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games.23 In this game, although cooperation is superior to mutual 
selfishness, each self-maximizing actor has the incentive to defect from 
cooperation regardless of what the other actor does. Using this game (only one 
out of seventy-eight two-agent, two-action strategic games), theorists studied 
repeated yet indefinite sequences of play among dyads of actors. These actors 
first cooperate and only subsequently defect if the other actor did so in the 
previous interaction. Theorists found that this ‘tit-for-tat’ behaviour proved to 
almost qualify as an ESS. This much-celebrated result formed the basis of 
evolutionary game theorists’ optimism that behaviour resembling altruism and 
                                               
23 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 202–33. 
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cooperation could emerge, even under the conditions of natural selection. The 
idea is that, assuming identically repeated encounters between the same two 
actors, purely self-interested action is consistent with behaviour that appears 
altruistic because the context rewards agency that seems to resemble 
cooperative and even selfless responses. Their optimism was undiminished 
even though this result is tenuous, only holding for pairs of actors encountering 
each other in repeating but indefinite sequences of interactions, and not large 
populations with ongoing anonymous interactions. 
Building on Dawkins’s work, the social scientist Robert Axelrod used this 
mathematical theory to popularize the tit-for-tat result throughout the social and 
behavioural sciences. Axelrod relied on these evolutionary game theoretic 
conclusions to transfer Dawkins’s insight from biological evolution to human 
subjects. In The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), Axelrod argues that tit-for-tat 
behaviour is primarily responsible for cooperation in human communities, and 
his position continues to maintain a widespread consensus.24 It provides a rather 
stark view of the possibilities for voluntary and participatory collective action. 
This is because, relying on orthodox game theory, it denies the rationality of 
joint optimization and the ability of higher life forms including humans to 
                                               
24 For discussion see S. M. Amadae, Prisoners of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 269–81. 
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achieve means of acting together through commitment, solidarity and shared 
intentionality.25 
From Dawkins’s Selfish Gene we can take away the view that behaviour is 
programmed as an algorithm that solves multi-agent optimization problems 
which are directly related to conditions of survival and reproduction under 
natural selection. The crux is that these optimization problems addressing 
tangible scarce resources are objective and non-negotiable. Their solutions 
using strategic rationality, as opposed to, for example, team reasoning and joint 
optimization, are deduced by assumptive analysis. Once the ESS concept was 
used in evolutionary game theory, insights were applied to human sociability, 
which theorists surmised must be the result of strategic encounters over scarce 
resources. By this analysis neither animals nor humans can avoid their 
evolutionarily programmed behavioural dispositions. Moreover, the chief 
characteristic of this understanding of agency-encompassing human conduct is 
                                               
25 For in-depth discussions see: John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New 
York: Free Press, 1997); Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality 
and Group Agents (Oxford University Press, 2016); Margaret Gilbert, Joint 
Commitment: How We Make the Social World (Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Margaret Gilbert, Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry (Oxford University 
Press, 2018); Amadae, Prisoners of Reason. 
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that deterministic algorithms moderate action with no role for subjective 
understanding or conscious judgement. 
Life as Self-Replicating Algorithm 
Moving forward four decades into the contemporary moment in which AI and 
machine learning are at the forefront of technological advance, we next 
consider the currently popular view that there may be little, if any, difference 
between human and computer-based intelligence. In this vein physicist Max 
Tegmark’s Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (2017) is 
among the boldest recent commentaries on the nature, purpose, and meaning of 
life, as well as envisioning potential futures for human beings and other life 
forms on earth. As a founding member of the Future of Life Institute, whose 
funding in large part was donated by Elon Musk, Tegmark has played a leading 
role in galvanizing a movement to critically reflect on and possibly direct the 
development of artificial general intelligence (AGI as he refers to it). Actors, 
who include researchers from the private sector corporate giants Baidu, IBM, 
Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Google, and DeepMind, converge on the 
consensus that security and the ethical advance of these new technologies is 
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non-negotiable for the future of humanity and life, because in their estimation 
AI is ‘[p]otentially more dangerous than nukes’.26 
In perceiving that AI is a potential threat to life, Tegmark draws into focus 
life as algorithm, intelligence as algorithmic optimization, and artificial 
intelligence as superhuman computing power with the capacity to undermine 
the systemic patterns of organization and material structure that have until now 
sustained human life. Whereas Dawkins’s comprehensive vision rests on life 
being an algorithm, and extrapolates using strategic games to provide the unity 
underlying all organisms’ interactions, Tegmark’s overarching perspective 
draws on physicists’ discovery that ‘all the laws of classical physics can be 
mathematically reformulated in an analogous way … [so] that nature … prefers 
the optimal way, which typically boils down to minimizing or maximizing 
some quantity’.27 Thus, according to Tegmark, even prior to any forms of life, 
‘the ultimate roots of goal-oriented behavior can be found in the laws of physics 
themselves’, which are manifested in simple processes.28 
Tegmark’s key insight here is that goal-oriented behaviour is intrinsic to 
the existence of the universe. He identifies the essential property of goal-
                                               
26 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 321. 
27 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 250–1. 
28 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 250. 
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seeking as ‘the past causing the future’, which he argues is equivalent to ‘nature 
optimizing something’.29 Locating goal-seeking in deterministic or stochastic 
physical processes makes it possible to contemplate that agency is prefigured in 
elementary cause-and-effect relationships occurring antecedent to the evolution 
of both basic and advanced life forms. It also sketches out in a skeletal fashion 
the conceptualization of mental processes as the experiences of physical cause-
and-effect states which themselves resemble primitive cause-and-effect 
relations inherent in the early history of the universe. Tegmark’s theory of 
human life’s potential, augmented by artificial computation, is derived from the 
laws of physics and not, for example, from the vistas of humanist, historical, or 
cultural explorations of human ingenuity. 
Tegmark builds his analysis of life as goal-seeking units of material 
components in three steps that correlate to the early universe before the advent 
of life, living material from its earliest expression in self-replicating complexes 
of particles to humans, and finally the development of artificial intelligences 
with proliferating inbuilt goals. His title Life 3.0 uses the lexicon of computer 
software development to refer to these three stages. The all-encompassing 
scope of his analysis is rooted in twenty-first-century science, and the widely 
                                               
29 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 251. 
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accepted belief that all aspects of nature must be consistent with, if not 
exhaustively explained by, the laws of physics, is manifest throughout the book. 
Thus Life 1.0 refers to the fact that, accordingly to the above analysis, 
‘Matter [is] seemingly intent on maximizing dissipation’, and hence evinces 
goal-seeking behaviour because in general ‘systems evolve to maximize their 
entropy’.30 In some analyses, life works against entropy by exhibiting highly 
organized structures and behavioural patterns. Yet Tegmark argues against this 
view by suggesting that life forms instead demonstrate the goal of extracting 
‘energy from their environment as efficiently as possible’.31 The reason that 
Life 2.0, viewed as organized structures of molecules that replicate themselves, 
is consistent with the telos of entropy rather than in opposition to it, is that 
living entities exploit reservoirs of energy and in so doing have the effect of 
dissipating them. Life itself manifests complexity, but its impact is to introduce 
greater disorganization into its environment. The logic seems a little convoluted 
because while life increases organization in structure and patterns of action, still 
to abide by the laws of physics, its purported aim is to promote entropy. Life 
seems itself to counter entropy as dissipation, and hence seems to violate the 
laws of physics. Solving the apparent discrepancy, Tegmark observes that ‘the 
                                               
30 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 275, 278. 
31 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 252. 
S.M. Amadae, “Life as Algorithm,” Twenty-First Century Approaches to 
Literature: Futures, ed. by Jenny Andersson and Sarah Kemp, Oxford 
University press, 2021. 
PREPRINT: Contact sm.amadae@helsinki.fi for final version 
fundamental goal (dissipation) didn’t change, but led to a different instrumental 
goal, that is a subgoal that helped accomplish the fundamental goal’.32 
Whereas the overarching purpose of Life 1.0 in chemical processes is 
entropic dissipation into the heat death of the universe, the subgoal or 
instrumental purpose of biological Life 2.0 is to assist in making that 
dissipation more efficient.33 Tegmark explains the general phenomenon by 
referring to ants on a kitchen floor on which sugar is sprinkled.34 Without the 
ants, the sugar crystals will remain as organized repositories of energy, defying 
the disorganization to which the universe aims towards. The ants serve the 
instrumental purpose of dissipating the concentrated energy deposits, much as 
humans do the same to fossil fuel deposits, transforming them into greenhouse 
gases. 
Just as Tegmark needs to explain how life exhibits organization, seemingly 
defying entropy, he also must account for how it is that although the purpose of 
life forms is self-replication, considering human life it seems that this organism 
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is capable of contradicting its biological destiny. Before providing an 
explanation for why humans may decide to avoid having progeny, Tegmark 
detours to consider how life forms are programmed to optimize their chances of 
survival and propagation. He refers to the AI champion and Nobel Laureate 
economist Herbert Simon, who argued that living creatures including humans 
only indirectly optimize their chances of self-replication and developed 
subroutines necessary to serve this function. Thus, life forms exhibit bounded 
rationality, which means that they act in accordance with rule of thumb rubrics 
for action that balance high cognitive costs against the need to act decisively. 
Tegmark explains, ‘This means that when Darwinian evolution is optimizing an 
organism to attain a goal, the best it can do is implement an approximate 
algorithm that works reasonably well in the restricted context where the agent 
typically finds itself.’ 35 Similar to Dawkins’s analysis, Tegmark too concludes 
that the behaviour of life forms is programmed by algorithms serving to 
maximize the chances of survival and reproduction. 
The physicist must then account for how it is that within human 
populations a considerable number of individuals do not demonstrate behaviour 
that is consistent with this biological imperative to survive and procreate. Here 
Tegmark makes the innovative theoretical move of holding that individuals can 
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rebel, as it were, against their biologically programmed behavioural algorithms 
because ‘we’re loyal only to our feelings’.36 Feelings are programmed 
experiences that provide feedback, such as pain and pleasure, to guide the 
conduct of organisms to serve the end of survival and reproduction. Because the 
circumstances of advanced civilization differ considerably from those of human 
ancestors hundreds of thousands of years ago, a gap opened up between the 
function feelings played in assisting the behavioural programming to procreate 
and the function they now play in steering behaviour that, within the present-
day context, is no longer effectively optimized to achieve replication. Thus 
whereas ‘the ultimate authority is now our feelings, not our genes … human 
behavior strictly speaking doesn’t have a single well-defined goal at all’.37 
People can pursue desires unrelated to biological reproduction. Yet in closing 
this part of his discussion, Tegmark wants readers to fully acknowledge that in 
its dissipative role of exploiting concentrated repositories of energy, ‘a rapidly 
growing fraction of matter was rearranged by living organisms to help 
accomplish their goals’.38 These goals are first and foremost to assist entropy 
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and second to replicate. On Earth there are just over 800 billion tons of matter 
organized into life forms, of which 400 billion tons are bacteria. 
Extending Life through Artificial Algorithms 
Life 3.0 is introduced with reference to the 125 billion tons of material 
generated by human life processes, including concrete, steel, and asphalt. 
Tegmark’s key insight is that ‘whereas evolved entities all have the same 
ultimate goal (replication), designed entities can have virtually any ultimate 
goal, even opposite ones’.39 Among designed entities with goals he includes 
ovens, refrigerators, computer programs, essentially all machines. For those 
hesitant about acknowledging that machines have goals, Tegmark posits that 
any physical system that provides a systematic cause–effect relationship 
between input states and output states can be described as having goals.40 
Life 3.0 is artificial and spans from general machines to artificial 
intelligences. Tegmark defines intelligence as ‘simply the ability to accomplish 
complex goals’.41 Machines are cause–effect devices that transform a 
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configuration of initial states into an end state. Revealing the exhaustive nature 
of his vision of life, Tegmark notes that ‘a truly well-defined goal would 
specify how all particles of our Universe should be arranged at the end of 
time’.42 The optimistic and grand vision he puts forward dovetails with 
Dawkins’s account of the social world using game theory because it reflects 
relationships among individuals that serve the aim of everyone’s utility 
maximization. In seeking a blueprint for how humans can capitalize on artificial 
intelligence, specifically artificial general intelligence and superintelligence that 
completely outpaces human intelligence, Tegmark turns to the topic of how the 
human inventors of AI may be able to achieve the following three aims: ‘1. 
Making AI learn our goals; 2. Making AI adopt our goals; and 3. Making AI 
retain our goals.’43 AI, which is coextensive with algorithms, is intelligent 
because it has the ability to accomplish complex goals. If it can serve human 
purposes, namely survival and replication writ large to act in the service of 
satisfying humans’ preferences, then as it enhances humans’ ability to exploit 
concentrated energy sources, it should serve to achieve outcomes that formerly 
would have been inconceivable. Preferences, which is the term economists use 
to represent individuals’ interests, relate to human feelings, which in turn are 
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the legacy of biological programming serving the function of survival and 
reproducing in early humanoids. Tegmark muses that ‘the only reason that we 
humans have any preferences at all may be that we’re the solution to an 
evolutionary optimization problem’.44 Preferences are normative over such 
categories of evaluation including taste, smell, aesthetic beauty, comfort, sexual 
desirability, goodness, and happiness. AI can be programmed ‘to figure out 
what people really want’.45 AI may be able to discern this by ‘observing their 
goal-oriented behavior’.46 Tegmark informs us that this is precisely the aim of 
contemporary AI researchers, who are ‘currently trying hard to enable machines 
to infer goals from [people’s] behavior’.47 Human preferences and behaviour in 
turn are governed by feelings programmed by evolutionary natural selection to 
guide conduct to achieve successful replication. 
Since some AI is capable of reflexive self-improvement, AI researchers are 
trying to discover how to ensure that this derivative intelligence will maintain 
the goals originally programmed into it by its human inventors. They have 
determined that even though it may not be possible to predict how AI’s ultimate 
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goals may evolve recursively, still, just as living creatures, AI will need to have 
predictable subgoals in order to maintain its existence: capability enhancement 
relying on self-preservation, resource acquisition, and information acquisition. 
From these it is possible to extrapolate the ‘desire for self-preservation’.48 All 
these latter attributes Tegmark refers to as stereotypically alpha-male traits, 
which we would only expect to find in ‘intelligences forged by viciously 
competitive Darwinian evolution’.49 Challenging the optimism of his own and 
AI researchers’ hope that AI will serve in realizing human ends, he warns that 
we cannot ‘dismiss “alpha-male” subgoals such as self-preservation and 
resource acquisition as relevant only to evolved organisms’ because they are 
inseparable from being a goal-seeking AI in the first place.50 Thus, he suggests 
that, possibly resembling features of Life 2.0, AI could both exhibit alpha-male 
traits and thus pursue goals at cross purposes with its human creators. 
Tegmark is keen to regain an optimistic footing and discusses human ethics 
and efforts to align the purposes of AI with human ends. Although recognizing 
the likelihood that ‘a complete scientific understanding of humans and human 
consciousness’ will discover that ‘there is no such thing as a soul’, he attempts 
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to identify the origins of the Golden Rule of conduct, of treating others as one 
would like oneself to be treated, as a product of evolution.51 Here Tegmark 
deviates from Dawkins’s analysis, which found that evolution only supports tit-
for-tat reciprocity in dyads of actors in repeating circumstances. Instead, he 
concludes that the incentives that reinforce cooperation are feelings of guilt, 
which are ‘our emotional punishment … meted out directly by our brain 
chemistry’, and external punishment from shaming and sanctions.52 
Acutely aware of the challenge of guaranteeing that AI will serve human 
goals and not its own unpredictable ends, Tegmark seeks to anchor an ethical 
system to govern AI which is consistent with his minimalist approach reducible 
to the laws of physics. In an effort to accommodate humanist enquiry, he 
combines the notion of agentive autonomy put forward by Immanuel Kant and 
contemporary economists’ argument for the free market.53 Essentially, he 
argues for an expanded form of utilitarianism, upholding the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number, translating it to read that ‘positive conscious 
experiences should be maximized and suffering should be minimized’ 
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independently of the site of consciousness.54 In his final chapter the physicist 
discusses a way to identify which complexes of matter, possible including AI, 
are conscious, and thus may be encompassed within ethical reflection as ends in 
themselves. 
Tegmark seeks to uphold the rights and freedoms expressed in the United 
Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The originally stated 
rights refer to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s four freedoms—from fear and want, 
and of speech and conscience—and in addition to marry, work, and own 
property. Following the theme of deanthropomorphizing utilitarianism, the 
physicist points to the rights of ‘freedom to think, learn, communicate, own 
property and not be harmed, whatever doesn’t infringe on the freedom of 
others’.55 The coverage of ethics and postulation of an ethical system of action 
capable of encompassing AI demonstrates the overarching proportions of 
Tegmark’s endeavour. 
Consciousness as the Experience of Algorithmic 
Computation 
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The final chapter of Life 3.0 sketches out positions on the nature of 
consciousness and what it could mean to have free will. Life 1.0 refers to the 
chemical building blocks of life obeying the fundamental laws of physics, and 
most specifically the law of entropy. Life 2.0 (grounded in biological processes) 
and Life 3.0 (augmenting Life 2.0 with artificial computational processes) both 
rely on algorithms for their maintenance and propagation through time. The 
concept of algorithm is central because, according to Tegmark, consciousness is 
related to information processing and computation. Intelligent systems of 
sufficiently advanced levels of development can demonstrate the same four 
steps of accomplishment: remembering, computing, learning, and 
experiencing.56 When these four elements are present, Tegmark believes that 
the material structure giving rises to these phenomena has subjective 
experience.57 This chapter puts forward some rather remarkable hypotheses, 
with perhaps the most salient being the opinion that ‘consciousness is the way 
information feels when being processed in certain ways’.58 The text implies, 
                                               
56 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 303. 
57 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 303. 
58 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 304. 
S.M. Amadae, “Life as Algorithm,” Twenty-First Century Approaches to 
Literature: Futures, ed. by Jenny Andersson and Sarah Kemp, Oxford 
University press, 2021. 
PREPRINT: Contact sm.amadae@helsinki.fi for final version 
therefore, that given its potential for development as information processors, AI 
may have experiences.59 
Underlying this observation that consciousness is directly related to 
algorithmic information processing is Tegmark’s need to account for how, 
although ‘consciousness is a physical phenomenon’, it ‘feels non-physical 
because it’s like waves and computations’.60 The essential point is that just like 
the well-known physical manifestation of waves passing through water, sound, 
and light, which resemble each other in form independently of the material 
substance through which the waves travel, so consciousness, thought of as 
information processing, could exist independently from the precise type of 
physical substrate giving rise to it. Tegmark reasons, ‘If consciousness is the 
way that information feels when it’s processed in certain ways, then it must be 
substrate-independent.’61 He concludes that ‘it’s only the structure of the 
information processing that matters, not the structure of the matter doing the 
information processing’.62 He goes on to speculate how ‘AI consciousness’ 
might feel, observing that it would have orders of magnitude more experiences 
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than the much slower human brain, but may have less overall systemic 
coherence.63 
Moving ahead to propose a theoretical basis, consistent with the laws of 
physics, for phenomenal consciousness, Tegmark turns to integrated 
information theory (IIT) pioneered by Guilio Tononi.64 According to IIT, the 
systemic integration of information processing correlates to the degree of 
phenomenal consciousness experienced by systems. Parts of the human brain 
that are the seat of conscious action are highly interdependent. IIT also 
proposes that every human brain state produces a unique correlate of 
experience, and suggests that with sufficient mapping of the brain it may be 
possible to discern what individuals are thinking or experiencing. As a new 
science there are intense debates among researchers in this field, which 
Tegmark acknowledges but passes over.65 His main goal is to take a position on 
free will that allows us to understand how we may feel as though we have 
autonomy of decision-making and action and yet at the same time function as 
causal mechanisms embodying predetermined algorithms. The experience of 
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65 See, e.g., Aaronson, ‘The Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine’. 
S.M. Amadae, “Life as Algorithm,” Twenty-First Century Approaches to 
Literature: Futures, ed. by Jenny Andersson and Sarah Kemp, Oxford 
University press, 2021. 
PREPRINT: Contact sm.amadae@helsinki.fi for final version 
free will follows from phenomenal consciousness being information processing 
which is enacted as computation. The sense of free will arises because, 
although the outcome of the computation is determined by the program, the 
outcome is not evident prior to the act of computation.66 Tegmark explains that 
‘when a system (brain or AI) makes a decision of type 1 [asserting a reason for 
action], it computes what to decide using some deterministic algorithm’.67 
Rational decision-making is algorithmic, and as such the outcome of the 
decision (not considering random elements) is predetermined by the cause–
effect physical substrate manifesting the computation. Reaching a culmination 
of analysis in conclusion, Life 3.0 states that the ‘subjective experience of free 
will is simply how … computations feel from inside: they don’t know the 
outcome of a computation until they’ve finished it’.68 The execution of the 
physically based algorithm is the computation, and ‘the computation is the 
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decision’.69 It goes without saying that for the person or AI making a 
computation, the answer is not previously known or there would be no need for 
the algorithmic exercise. 
<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 27.2 NEAR HERE> 
Intelligence Gives Rise to Meaning as 
Afterthought or Prime Mover? 
Given the novelty and recentness of Tegmark’s contribution, and the relative 
familiarity people have with Dawkins, I have chosen to devote more time to 
elaborating his vast vision of life based on algorithms as a means of 
optimization and decision-making. It is noteworthy that these two secular 
thinkers identify with traditionally leftist politics of socio-economic inclusion 
and the importance of individual self-determination through choice. Yet, 
grounded in a materialist vision of life and social behaviour, each theorist opens 
the door to potentially dystopian futures. Dawkins wrestled with how 
cooperation could have evolved in organisms undergoing a process of natural 
selection, which he argues must make each individually ruthlessly competitive. 
He denies the viability of either their solidarity or group selection and rests his 
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hope on the programmed behaviour referred to as tit-for-tat.70 However, his 
mechanism is flawed because in large-scale anonymous populations of actors 
tit-for-tat cannot serve to buttress cooperation given the assumptions he makes 
about the nation of selection, resource constraints, and the types of actors 
required to survive and propagate.71 
A step ahead of Tegmark, Dawkins devotes critical analysis to the cultural 
production of memes, a concept that lives large in the popular imagination and 
is routinely expressed in social media.72 Although providing only a sketchy 
account of how the production and dispersion of memes mirrors the process of 
natural selection, Dawkins at least considers that cultural products merit 
independent analysis. He perceives that a gap has opened up between biological 
evolution and humans’ competition to achieve fitness and to procreate versus 
individuals’ creativity in generating social artefacts. These cultural productions 
themselves compete for attention and replication but do not directly assist in 
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biological reproduction. Thus, he also seemingly permits that the cultural space 
of genesis obeys its own logics that cannot necessarily be reduced to 
algorithmically driven behavioural expressions that follow the same logic of 
supporting survival and the material propagation of selfish genes. It is not clear 
that the theoretical account put forward by game theorists permits such a gap to 
open between actors’ pursuit of scarce resources and their social interactions. 
Thus, although ultimately unsatisfactory as an account either of how cultural 
products proliferate or of how agents’ social worlds become imbued with 
meanings that in turn shape collective agency, with respect to considering the 
role of memes in social life, Dawkins’s discussion is refreshing. 
The narrowly constrained game theoretic perspective has no role for 
cultural meaning as the basis for action that surpasses the basic motives of 
accumulation of scarce resources useful for satisfying preferences. Attributes of 
social life that could be thought of as luxuries once life’s basic conditions are 
met, which for Plato would include the life of contemplation, are all enveloped 
in the exercise of preference satisfaction. It may seem that everything 
individuals could possibly want, including the life of a philosopher-king, could 
be accommodated by a desire-based psychology endowing every individual 
with a unique ranking of preferences over every conceivable state of the world. 
However, this view ultimately merges with Tegmark’s position mentioned 
above that ‘a truly well-defined goal would specify how all particles in our 
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Universe should be arranged’ at any time or the end of time.73 In the game 
theoretic universe, which Tegmark acknowledges in Life 3.0, all individual 
agents must strategically compete against each other. Cooperation emerges 
when it is a Nash equilibrium, or a solution to a multiple constraint 
optimization problem respecting every individual’s preferences, when there is a 
sufficient alignment of interests. When there is not a sufficient alignment to 
sustain the sociability requisite for the stability represented by the Nash 
equilibrium concept, then ‘it may be in everyone’s interest to relinquish some 
power to a higher level in the hierarchy that can punish cheaters’.74 
The game theoretic account (focusing analysis on equilibrium solutions to 
action situations comprised of individuals’ optimizing over physical entities, 
with projectable properties subject to study using the laws of physics) 
recognizes no role for the production of meaning as a catalyst for action 
independent from utility maximization. Here there is a stark divide between 
John Searle and other social ontologists who follow in the steps of the second 
incarnation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy on the one hand (Tuomela, 
Gilbert), and game theorists on the other who seek to reduce all attributes of 
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human existence to strategic games (Gintis, Binmore, Guala).75 There is only 
space here to provide a simple example of the differences in approach to 
understanding the meaning of human existence, and the nature of social 
institutions that have traditionally accorded the groundwork for cooperative 
ventures. John Searle explains the nature of money as a social invention that 
cannot be reduced to the laws of physics because it depends on human 
understanding and commitment to animate its circulation. He argues that 
collective acceptance of individuals’ participation in social institutions relies on 
reflexive self-recruitment to obey informal norms and formal rules.76 
Searle describes how we can put a pile of dollar bills by our dog’s food 
bowl, and teach the dog to give us a dollar every time it wants to eat. However, 
this does not mean that the dog is paying for its food. The difference between 
the game theoretic equilibrium account of institutions and that of Searle and 
other social ontologists is the following. While according to game theorists, 
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behaviour is programmed to maximize value in accordance with physical 
properties of the world, according to Searle, the attribution of meaning is a 
product of human intention that opens spaces of possibility that cannot be 
reduced to optimizing physically measurable properties. Thus, for game 
theorists, animal and human behaviour equally is explainable by those beings’ 
propensity to accumulate value tethered to physical material, most prominently, 
sources of energy. 
Oxford University philosopher of information Luciano Floridi is clear on 
how computers as algorithms are as yet on one side of a divide dividing human 
intelligence and AI. This split separates actors who have an encompassing 
grasp of the context of their action and the semantic representation of meanings 
of their actions within that context, from AIs which are ‘purely syntactic 
machines’.77 Floridi’s point is crucial because he realizes that in order to 
accommodate the world of AI as symbolic algorithmic manipulation, human 
intelligence must increasingly accommodate its limitations. This could signify 
relinquishing a more robust understanding of intelligence with rich semantic 
content and meaning-laden narratives. Thus, human action would be guided by 
algorithmic information processing of data which lacks situational 
understanding reflected in the mastery of a rich natural language. Possible 
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futures that integrate computers as partners in intelligence and the experience of 
life foreclose on the formation of collective imaginaries or aspirations 
developed as a consequence of co-created practices that recruit participation 
through commitment, understanding, and meaning. Instead, collective 
expressions of agency are merely the equilibrium or disequilibrium outcomes of 
individual utility maximization which tracks scarce material resources. Thus 
individuals’ experience of selfhood and their relations with others, increasingly 
mediated by AI and other digital technologies, may contribute to alienation and 
overwhelming nihilism consistent with facing a universal telos of entropy, as 
reflected in John Ledger’s artwork entitled “A Deep Paralysis.” 
Tegmark’s treatment of life, although consistent with purposive behaviour 
being explainable by material cause-and-effect processes manifested in 
algorithmic computation, neither focuses on nor defers to individualistic 
competition via strategic rationality as a non-negotiable feature of life. Even 
despite his noteworthy optimism of the third stage of life, which succeeds mere 
physics and organic life as self-replication by realizing a form of AI that can be 
built to satisfy human preferences, Life 3.0 harbours a dark potential set of 
futures. Their existence is nascent in Tegmark’s acknowledgement that on the 
one hand higher intelligence must necessarily seek self-preservation in order to 
achieve any of its goals; on the other hand, artificial intelligence is distinct from 
natural life forms because it is not wedded to replication to maintain its 
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existence.78 While people must have progeny for their species to continue into 
future generations, AI can exist on a much longer scale and could undergo 
repairs to subsystems without facing mortality in the way humans currently do. 
Thus, in his words, whereas ‘all life emerged with the single goal of 
replications … AIs can enjoy this ultimate freedom of being fully unfettered 
from prior goals’, most significantly the need to replicate.79 On the positive 
side, he muses, this independence from biological drives to reproduce may 
allow AIs to be free from evolutionary biases programmed into their 
hardwiring, and ‘can make AIs more ethical than humans in some deep 
sense’.80 Here Tegmark conveys a laudable optimism consistent with his plea 
that we build AI ‘to help humans pursue their human goals’.81 
In his concluding pages it is almost as if the technological visionary cast 
aside some of his earlier words about the laws of physics themselves inscribing 
purposive action into the universe even before any life forms evolved. In his 
initial chapters, Tegmark referred to the laws of physics describing 
optimization, and optimization being a form of purposive action that in the 
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second law of thermodynamics means that the universe aims towards the 
dissipation of energy in its heat death. He notes that ‘goal-oriented behavior can 
emerge from goal-less deterministic laws of physics’, by which he means that 
the laws of physics ‘involve optimization’, and optimization describes goal-
oriented behaviour.82 Recalling earlier points he recaps that thermodynamics 
‘has the built-in goal of dissipation’, that is increasing the measure of disorder; 
and ‘Life is a phenomenon that can help dissipate’ and hence increase disorder 
more rapidly than the universe without life.83 Hence life has the inbuilt purpose 
of increasing the entropy of the universe and does so by extracting energy from 
concentrated sources and releasing them as less ordered by-products of its 
action. 
Given that even though AI may not have the need of material replication 
characterizing Life 2.0, as Tegmark refers to it, he suggests that AIs must still 
take steps to ensure they have access to the resources to maintain existence. 
They are dependent on their material substrata, notwithstanding the fact that 
computation as a phenomenon may be independent from any particular type of 
material basis. This suggests that AI is not any more independent from the 
inherent aims of dissipation than natural life forms. It is not clear that Tegmark 
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S.M. Amadae, “Life as Algorithm,” Twenty-First Century Approaches to 
Literature: Futures, ed. by Jenny Andersson and Sarah Kemp, Oxford 
University press, 2021. 
PREPRINT: Contact sm.amadae@helsinki.fi for final version 
realizes the gravity of this observation, because the easiest path to dissipation is 
destruction. Of course, both humans and artificial intelligences can engage in 
conflict and warfare. Both have the capacity of destroying organized systems 
with the outcome of inducing disorder. Just as human life has a greater 
capability for destruction through its intentional agency, so too could 
algorithmic computational devices trigger the mass destruction of human 
civilization planet-wide.84 
The vision of life proposed by Tegmark—and also Dawkins—misses the 
power of the human mind to invest experiences with meaning, and to accord 
value to meaning as a function of both circumstantial context and decisions that 
are freely about systemic considerations wholly independent from either 
incentives or realizing goals by instantiating ‘how all the particles in our 
Universe should be arranged’.85 Tegmark pays lip service to what he recognizes 
as the fact that ‘It’s not our Universe giving meaning to conscious beings, but 
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conscious beings giving meaning to our Universe.’86 However, given that all 
physical entities need to obey the laws of physics and hence act in accordance 
with the function of dissipation, and, moreover, can only act purposively by 
maximizing physically measurable quantities, the spatiotemporal locations for 
identifying or inscribing meaning are limited. The meaningful pursuits of 
intelligent actors seem to be inherently limited to predicting the future, 
providing metrics of possible futures, determining the computational power of 
the universe, assessing the algorithmic complexity of the universe and 
measuring the quantity of consciousness in the universe.87 Unlike in Searle’s 
and the social ontologists’ understanding of meaning, for Tegmark as well as 
game theorists, meaning operating as values must be directly correlated to 
preference satisfaction, which tracks objectively measurable states of the 
universe. Individuals and collectives do not intentionally co-create their future 
world. Instead of possibly realizing shared intentions and jointly imagined 
futures, if we ignore Floridi’s warning about demoting our cognizant selves to 
accommodate algorithmic information processing systems throughout our 
environments, we may reduce our future socio-technical imaginaries to 
individualistically competing preference satisfaction machines. 
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